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“The Case for Three Assassins,” by David Welsh and David S. Lifton, was published in the January 1967 issue of Ramparts, pages 77–102. Written only a few years after President John F. Kennedy’s assassination, it was one of the earliest extensive attempts to refute the Warren Commission through its own testimony, exhibits, medical evidence, and internal disagreements.

The article’s central conclusion is that at least three gunmen fired at Kennedy’s limousine:

1. Two gunmen fired from behind the presidential motorcade.

2. At least one gunman fired from the right front, near the grassy knoll.

That conclusion remains disputed. The article exposes genuine weaknesses and contradictions in the original investigation, but it does not conclusively identify three shooters. Later scientific reviews supported some of its criticisms while rejecting or weakening several of its most important interpretations.

The complete article is preserved in the Hood College JFK Collection.

Historical context

President Kennedy was assassinated in Dealey Plaza, Dallas, on November 22, 1963. The Warren Commission concluded in 1964 that:

• Lee Harvey Oswald fired
  three shots from the sixth-floor southeast window of the Texas School Book
  Depository.
• One shot probably missed.
• One bullet passed through
  Kennedy’s upper back and throat and then caused Governor John Connally’s
  chest, wrist, and thigh wounds.
• The last shot struck
  Kennedy’s head.
• Oswald acted alone.

Welsh and Lifton challenged both pillars of that conclusion: that all the shots came from behind and that only one person fired them.

Their article appeared during the first major wave of criticism of the Warren Report. It relied heavily on Edward Jay Epstein’s 1966 book Inquest, the Warren Commission’s 26 volumes of hearings and exhibits, contemporary newspaper accounts, witness statements, medical testimony, photographs, and the Zapruder film.

The structure of the argument

The article is divided into two principal sections.

Part One: Shots from behind

Welsh and Lifton argue that Kennedy and Connally were struck by separate bullets too close together for both shots to have been fired from Oswald’s bolt-action Mannlicher-Carcano rifle.

Their argument depends on several propositions:

• The rifle required at least
  approximately 2.3 seconds between aimed shots.
• Kennedy and Connally
  appeared to react to their wounds less than 2.3 seconds apart.
• Kennedy’s back bullet did
  not pass through his body.
• Therefore, the bullet that
  struck Connally must have been a separate shot.
• Because the two shots were
  too close together for one bolt-action rifle, at least two men must have
  fired from behind.

Part Two: Shots from the right front

The authors then argue that an additional gunman fired from the grassy-knoll area. They rely upon:

• Witnesses who believed shots
  came from the knoll.
• Kennedy’s violent rearward
  movement after the head shot.
• Descriptions of a large
  wound at the rear of Kennedy’s head.
• Parkland Hospital doctors’
  early description of the throat wound as an apparent entrance wound.
• Witness reports of smoke,
  movement, suspicious people, or activity near the knoll.

Combining these two sections produces the article’s “three assassins” conclusion: two shooters behind the limousine and a third to the right front.

Part One: The alleged two shooters from behind

1. The “42-frame constraint”

The article’s first major argument concerns the timing of the shots.

The Zapruder camera operated at approximately 18.3 frames per second. FBI test shooters reported that the minimum time required to operate the rifle’s bolt, reacquire the target, and fire again was approximately 2.25–2.3 seconds. That interval corresponds to roughly 41–42 Zapruder frames.

Welsh and Lifton contend that Kennedy and Connally were hit no more than approximately 33 frames apart. If they were struck by separate bullets within that interval, one person using the Carcano could not have fired both.

This is why the single-bullet theory is essential to the lone-gunman reconstruction. If Kennedy and Connally were hit by the same bullet, no second shot was required within the rifle’s minimum cycling interval. But if they were struck by different bullets less than 2.3 seconds apart, a second gunman would be necessary.

The article quotes Warren Commission assistant counsel Norman Redlich as saying that separate bullets striking the two men would be synonymous with two assassins.

Important qualification

The Warren Commission did not claim absolute certainty about which shot struck Connally. It said one bullet “most probably” passed through both men and also maintained that determining precisely which shot struck Connally was unnecessary to its essential conclusion.

The article treats the uncertainty surrounding the single-bullet theory as uncertainty about the lone-assassin conclusion itself. That is a forceful rhetorical argument, but it is not quite a mathematical proof. It depends on the assumed timing of the first observable reactions and on the proposition that those reactions occurred immediately upon bullet impact.

Later analysis concluded that Kennedy and Connally could have been struck at essentially the same time, with Connally’s visible reaction developing slightly later.

2. Kennedy’s back wound

The article’s most substantial section concerns the bullet that entered Kennedy’s back.

Welsh and Lifton present several pieces of evidence suggesting that the bullet did not exit through the throat:

• Early newspaper reports
  described a bullet lodged in Kennedy’s shoulder or penetrating only a
  short distance.
• The initial FBI summary said
  there was “no point of exit.”
• An FBI supplemental report
  reportedly stated that the bullet penetrated less than a finger’s length.
• Autopsy witnesses said the
  doctors initially could not trace a continuous path from the back wound.
• Autopsy chief Dr. James
  Humes testified that attempts to probe the wound were unsuccessful.
• Humes destroyed his original
  notes and an early draft of the autopsy report.
• The throat wound had been
  enlarged by a tracheotomy before the Bethesda doctors saw the body.

These matters represent real problems in the original investigation. The autopsy was conducted under difficult circumstances and did not follow what would now be regarded as best forensic practice. The prosectors did not initially know that Kennedy had possessed a small throat wound before the tracheotomy. They also failed to perform a complete dissection of the back-to-throat wound track.

Why the initial FBI report differed

The early FBI description was based substantially on the observations of agents James Sibert and Francis O’Neill during the autopsy. At the beginning of the examination, the doctors believed the back bullet might have penetrated only a short distance because:

• They could not find the
  bullet in the body.
• They could not probe a
  continuous channel.
• They did not initially know
  that a small wound had existed in Kennedy’s throat.
• The original throat opening
  had been obscured by the emergency tracheotomy.

After Dr. Humes communicated with Parkland physician Dr. Malcolm Perry and learned that a wound had existed in the throat before the tracheotomy, the autopsy doctors concluded that the back and throat wounds were connected.

The Warren Report said the projectile passed between muscles, bruised the upper pleural region and top of the right lung, damaged the trachea, and emerged through the throat. Because the passage was largely through soft tissue and fascial planes, a probe would not necessarily pass freely through the entire channel. The Commission’s explanation is available in its official discussion of the medical evidence.

Thus, the early FBI reports establish that the wound’s path was initially misunderstood. They do not by themselves prove that the final autopsy conclusion was fabricated.

3. Location of the wound

The article argues that Kennedy was struck in the back below the neck, rather than at the “base of the neck” as the Warren Report sometimes described it.

Evidence cited by critics includes:

• The holes in Kennedy’s shirt
  and jacket.
• The autopsy face sheet.
• The death certificate
  prepared by Dr. George Burkley.
• Descriptions from witnesses
  who saw the body.
• Photographs showing the back
  wound below the shoulder line.

This is a legitimate criticism of the Warren Report’s wording. The wound was in Kennedy’s upper back, below the anatomical neck. Calling it a “neck wound” can give a misleading impression.

However, the relevant trajectory does not depend solely on whether the external opening is described as being in the “back” or “neck.” Kennedy’s posture, the slope of the street, the height of the Depository window, and the position of Connally’s jump seat must all be included. Later reconstructions concluded that the wound could align with a shot from the Depository.

4. Governor Connally’s wounds

Connally was wounded in:

• The right rear portion of
  his chest.
• The chest below the right
  nipple, where the bullet exited.
• His right wrist, where the
  radius was fractured.
• His left thigh.

Connally always believed he had been struck by a different bullet from the one that first hit Kennedy. His recollection is important, but he also acknowledged that he did not see Kennedy at the precise moment Kennedy was first struck.

Welsh and Lifton emphasize that Connally appeared to remain uninjured for a noticeable period after Kennedy began reacting. They interpret Connally’s later turn and collapse as evidence of a separate impact.

Later film analysis found possible indications of an earlier Connally reaction:

• His right shoulder drops.
• His cheeks appear to puff.
• His hat moves sharply.
• His right wrist may be
  disturbed.
• The lapel of his jacket
  appears to move outward.

These signs are debated, but they reduce the certainty of the article’s claim that the two men were visibly struck at separate times.

5. Commission Exhibit 399—the “stretcher bullet”

CE 399 is the nearly intact 6.5-millimeter bullet found at Parkland Hospital. Critics commonly call it the “magic bullet,” although that was not an official Commission term.

Welsh and Lifton argue that CE 399 could not have:

• Passed through Kennedy’s
  body.
• Passed through Connally’s
  chest.
• Shattered his wrist.
• Entered his thigh.
• Emerged in its comparatively
  undeformed condition.

They also discuss whether the bullet could have been planted.

What the condition of the bullet actually shows

CE 399 was not completely “pristine.” It was flattened at its base, lost some lead, and showed deformation. Nevertheless, it retained most of its original shape and mass.

The bullet’s condition looks surprising when its injuries are described without considering its construction and behavior. It was a full-metal-jacket military bullet designed to resist expansion. Under the single-bullet reconstruction:

• It passed through Kennedy
  mainly through soft tissue.
• It passed through Connally’s
  chest without directly striking a major chest bone.
• It had begun to yaw or
  tumble before striking Connally’s wrist.
• It hit the wrist sideways or
  at an angle rather than nose-first.
• It entered the thigh only
  superficially.

Warren Commission tests concluded that a tumbling, reduced-velocity bullet could produce Connally’s injuries while retaining a shape generally comparable to CE 399. The Commission’s wound-ballistics discussion is reproduced in Appendix 10 of the Warren Report.

Was CE 399 planted?

The article raises suspicions concerning:

• Which stretcher held the
  bullet.
• Who first found it.
• Breaks or uncertainty in its
  chain of custody.
• Whether witnesses could
  positively identify the exhibit later shown to them.

Those are meaningful evidentiary questions. Nevertheless, no direct evidence has established that anyone planted CE 399. The planting claim requires an unknown person to have possessed an appropriate bullet and placed it in the hospital under highly uncertain circumstances. Suspicious documentation is not equivalent to proof of deliberate substitution.

Part Two: The alleged grassy-knoll gunman

1. Witnesses who heard shots from the knoll

The article lists 64 witnesses whose statements allegedly indicated that one or more shots came from the grassy knoll.

Witness evidence from Dealey Plaza is genuinely divided. Numerous witnesses:

• Heard a shot or shots from
  the knoll.
• Saw smoke near the trees or
  fence.
• Ran toward the knoll
  immediately after the shooting.
• Reported suspicious movement
  or people near the fence.
• Thought the final shots came
  extremely close together.

Other witnesses believed the shots came from the Depository, while some could not determine their origin.

Sound localization in Dealey Plaza was difficult because sharp rifle reports could echo from buildings, concrete structures, the triple underpass, and the open plaza. A witness’s impression of direction is evidence, but it cannot independently establish the precise source of a shot.

The number “64” also needs qualification. The witnesses were not all making the same claim. Some positively identified the knoll, while others merely pointed generally toward the front, heard an echo, reported smoke, or described suspicious conduct.

2. The fatal head shot and the “head snap”

The Zapruder film shows Kennedy’s head and upper body moving sharply backward and to his left after the fatal head wound.

Welsh and Lifton argue that this movement is powerful evidence that the shot came from Kennedy’s right front. To many viewers, this remains one of the most intuitively persuasive arguments for a grassy-knoll shooter.

But the direction a body moves after a high-velocity head wound does not reliably establish the bullet’s direction. Several forces can influence the movement:

• Neuromuscular reactions.
• Violent extension of the
  back muscles.
• Loss of postural control.
• The limousine’s motion.
• Reactions to the massive
  disruption of brain tissue.
• A possible forward movement
  immediately before the larger rearward motion.

The 1978–79 House Select Committee on Assassinations consulted specialists and concluded that Kennedy’s rearward movement was not fundamentally inconsistent with a shot from behind.

3. Medical descriptions of the head wound

Parkland doctors and other witnesses frequently described a substantial defect in the right rear or right rear-side portion of Kennedy’s head. The article interprets that as an exit wound caused by a bullet entering from the right front.

This is one of the most complicated issues in the case because there are genuine discrepancies among:

• The Parkland descriptions.
• The Bethesda autopsy report.
• The autopsy photographs.
• The X-rays.
• Witness diagrams prepared
  years later.
• The precise anatomical
  terminology used by different observers.

A large rearward defect would support a front-to-back trajectory if it were conclusively an exit wound. But the autopsy photographs and X-rays were later studied by forensic panels that concluded:

• A small entrance wound was
  present in the rear of the skull.
• The major skull defect
  extended through the upper-right and front-right regions.
• The bullet traveled
  generally from rear to front.
• No medical evidence
  demonstrated a bullet entrance in the right temple or front of the head.

The HSCA forensic pathology panel concluded, by a vote of eight to one, that Kennedy was struck by two bullets and both entered from behind. Dr. Cyril Wecht was the consistent dissenter. The panel’s findings are summarized in the HSCA forensic-evidence report.

4. The throat wound

When Kennedy reached Parkland Hospital, Dr. Malcolm Perry observed a small wound in the lower front of the throat. He enlarged it to perform a tracheotomy.

At the early press conference, Perry described it as appearing to be an entrance wound. Other Parkland physicians held similar initial impressions.

Welsh and Lifton argue that a wound in the front of the throat must mean a bullet was fired from the front.

That conclusion is too certain. The Parkland doctors:

• Were trying to save Kennedy,
  not conducting an autopsy.
• Did not examine the back
  wound.
• Did not dissect the throat
  wound’s track.
• Had no knowledge at that
  time of the back wound.
• Could not definitively
  determine the projectile’s direction from the throat opening alone.

A small, clean throat wound can resemble an entrance wound even if it is the exit of a slowed, relatively stable bullet passing primarily through soft tissue.

The failure to preserve and carefully document the throat wound before the tracheotomy created permanent uncertainty. It was an unavoidable consequence of emergency treatment, not evidence by itself of deception.

What later investigations found

The House Select Committee on Assassinations

Congress reinvestigated the Kennedy assassination between 1976 and 1979. Its conclusions were unusual because they partly supported both sides.

The HSCA found that:

• Oswald fired three shots.
• Two shots struck Kennedy
  from behind.
• The single-bullet
  explanation was consistent with the medical, photographic, and trajectory
  evidence.
• The bullet fragments and
  physical evidence indicated only two bullets struck the limousine’s
  occupants.
• Acoustic evidence suggested
  a high probability that another gunman fired from the grassy knoll.
• The presumed knoll shot
  missed.
• Kennedy was therefore
  “probably assassinated as a result of a conspiracy.”
• The committee could not
  identify the additional gunman or the conspiracy’s extent.

These findings initially appeared to support a two-gunman conspiracy—but not the Ramparts theory of three successful or identifiable firing positions. See the HSCA’s official summary of findings.

The later acoustic review

The HSCA’s conspiracy conclusion depended principally upon an audio recording from a Dallas police channel. Analysts believed that impulses on the recording corresponded to four shots, including one from the knoll.

The National Research Council’s Committee on Ballistic Acoustics reexamined the recording in 1982 and found powerful evidence that the supposed gunshot impulses occurred approximately one minute after the assassination. It concluded that the acoustic analysis did not support the claim that a grassy-knoll shot was recorded.

The committee also found that recognizable cross-channel police communications placed the relevant impulses at the wrong time. Its conclusion substantially undermined the scientific foundation of the HSCA’s conspiracy finding. The National Academies report provides the review.

Later researchers have continued to debate the Dictabelt, but no generally accepted acoustic finding has proved that it recorded assassination gunfire.

Strengths of the article

“The Case for Three Assassins” remains historically valuable for several reasons.

It identified legitimate investigative failures

The article correctly emphasized:

• The inadequate and poorly
  coordinated autopsy.
• The failure to dissect the
  entire back-to-throat wound track.
• Destruction of Humes’s
  original notes and draft.
• Conflicting early FBI and
  autopsy descriptions.
• Ambiguous language
  concerning the back wound.
• Problems documenting CE
  399’s discovery and chain of custody.
• The Commission’s reliance on
  a reconstruction it described only as “most probable.”
• The failure to explore some
  witness reports as thoroughly as their importance warranted.

It used primary government records

Rather than relying entirely on rumor, the authors cited the Warren Commission’s own testimony and exhibits. That gave the article considerably more substance than many later speculative assassination accounts.

It demonstrated the importance of the single-bullet issue

The article correctly recognized that the timing problem is central. If Kennedy and Connally were definitely struck by different bullets inside the rifle’s minimum firing interval, more than one shooter would logically be required.

It anticipated later congressional concerns

More than a decade later, the HSCA also criticized the quality of the original investigation and concluded—although on now-disputed acoustic evidence—that Kennedy was probably killed as the result of a conspiracy.

Weaknesses of the article

It sometimes treats preliminary information as superior to later findings

Early FBI and newspaper reports were written while the examination was incomplete and information from Dallas had not yet been reconciled with the Bethesda findings. An early report can reveal confusion, but it is not necessarily more accurate merely because it came first.

It converts uncertainty into affirmative proof

The authors repeatedly reason that because the official explanation contains uncertainty, the three-gunman explanation must be true. That does not necessarily follow. Weakness in one theory is not affirmative evidence for every competing theory.

The second rear gunman is inferred rather than independently located

The article does not identify:

• A second rear firing
  position.
• A second weapon.
• Cartridge cases from a
  second rear location.
• A recovered bullet
  conclusively fired from another rifle.
• A witness who clearly saw a
  second rear gunman firing.

The alleged second rear shooter is primarily a deduction from the timing argument.

The grassy-knoll evidence is suggestive but inconclusive

The witness reports, head movement, and initial medical impressions raise legitimate questions. But later forensic panels found that the physical evidence showed two bullets striking Kennedy from behind. No bullet, cartridge case, rifle, or confirmed firing position was recovered from the knoll.

The title is stronger than the proof

“The Case for Three Assassins” implies that three shooters were demonstrated. A more precise description would be:

A cumulative argument that inconsistencies in the timing, medical evidence, and witness testimony could indicate multiple shooters.

That is an important argument, but it falls short of conclusively establishing three assassins.

Overall assessment

The article is a serious and historically significant critique of the Warren Commission, not merely a collection of unsupported rumors. Welsh and Lifton found genuine contradictions in the assassination record and drew attention to investigative deficiencies that deserved further examination.

Nevertheless, its precise claim—at least two shooters from behind and one from the grassy knoll—has not been proved by the surviving physical evidence.

The strongest defensible conclusions are:

• The Kennedy autopsy was
  seriously flawed in procedure and documentation.
• Early reports conflicted
  with the final official reconstruction.
• The chain of custody and
  documentation surrounding some evidence could have been much better.
• A substantial number of
  witnesses believed shots came from the knoll.
• These facts justified
  continued investigation and public skepticism.
• Later forensic review
  nevertheless supported two bullets striking Kennedy from behind and found
  the single-bullet trajectory physically possible.
• The HSCA’s principal
  scientific basis for a second gunman—the police recording—was subsequently
  discredited by the National Research Council.
• No conclusive physical
  evidence currently establishes three gunmen.

Therefore, “The Case for Three Assassins” is best read as an influential prosecutorial brief against the completeness and certainty of the Warren Report—not as a scientifically conclusive solution to the assassination.