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Waldo a week ago

39.HENRY KISSINGER AND THE OVERTHROW OR DESTABILIZATION OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

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1. Do your own research on the information provided and then come up with your own conclusions.

2. This article contains many names and other information that can be researched.

3. Trust your gut feeling on information provided as this post may contain slanted information.

The historical record does not support the claim that Henry Kissinger personally “overthrew” a long list of governments. It does show, however, that he helped direct, approve, recommend, conceal, or defend covert policies intended to remove, weaken, or prevent certain governments from taking power.

The strongest documented cases are Chile and Bolivia. Angola, Iraq, and Portugal involved serious covert intervention or destabilization efforts but do not fit the definition of a completed Kissinger-directed overthrow. Allegations concerning Cambodia, Cyprus, Bangladesh, and Argentina require even greater qualification.

What the newspaper image establishes

Your clipping is from The Dallas Morning News, November 23, 1975. It carries a United Press International report about the Senate Intelligence Committee investigation—often called the Church Committee investigation—into CIA activities in Chile.

The article reports that:

• President
  Richard Nixon instructed CIA Director Richard Helms to organize an effort
  to prevent Salvador Allende from taking office in 1970.
• Nixon
  authorized as much as $10 million for the operation.
• The
  operation was concealed from Secretary of State William Rogers, Defense
  Secretary Melvin Laird, the American ambassador in Chile, and parts of the
  normal State and Defense Department structure.
• Kissinger
  attended the September 15, 1970 White House meeting at which Nixon issued
  the instructions.
• The CIA
  pursued two policies:

• Track I:
  Political, financial, and propaganda operations intended to persuade the
  Chilean Congress not to confirm Allende.
• Track
  II—Project FUBELT: Secret contacts with Chilean military
  officers intended to encourage a coup.

That distinction—between directly running the final coup and deliberately creating conditions for an overthrow—is central to understanding Kissinger’s record.

Detailed country list

1. Chile — the clearest case

Preventing Allende from taking office, 1970

Salvador Allende won a plurality in Chile’s September 4, 1970 presidential election. Because he did not receive an absolute majority, the Chilean Congress had to select between the leading candidates.

Nixon and Kissinger feared that Allende would establish a durable Marxist government through democratic means. Kissinger argued that an elected Marxist government in Chile might be more politically influential than a revolutionary communist takeover.

At the September 15 White House meeting, Nixon instructed Helms to prevent Allende from taking power. Helms’s handwritten notes recorded the authorization of up to $10 million and Nixon’s order to make Chile’s economy suffer. The exact wording commonly rendered as “make the economy scream” comes from those notes.

Kissinger and Track II

Track II bypassed the State Department and Ambassador Edward Korry. Its objective was to encourage Chilean military officers to intervene before Congress confirmed Allende.

A declassified record of an October 15, 1970 meeting shows Kissinger discussing the need to conceal American encouragement of a coup. The CIA was instructed to keep pressure on “every Allende weak spot” even if the immediate attempt failed. State Department FRUS record

CIA officers contacted Chilean military conspirators and supplied weapons to a group attempting to abduct Gen. René Schneider, commander in chief of the Chilean Army. Schneider defended the military’s constitutional duty not to interfere with the presidential succession.

On October 22, 1970, conspirators attempting to seize Schneider shot him. He died three days later. The precise weapons used in the fatal attack apparently were not the weapons supplied by the CIA to another group, but the CIA had plainly participated in the broader environment of coup and kidnapping conspiracies.

Destabilizing Allende, 1970–1973

After Allende took office, Kissinger chaired the 40 Committee, which reviewed major covert operations. The United States:

• Secretly
  financed opposition parties.
• Supported
  opposition newspapers, especially El Mercurio.
• Financed or
  assisted business and private-sector opposition.
• Applied
  pressure against international loans and credits.
• Maintained
  contacts with Chilean military officers.
• Used
  propaganda to portray Allende’s government as economically and politically
  disastrous.

In August 1973, the 40 Committee authorized more assistance to opposition parties and the private sector. A CIA memorandum acknowledged that increased pressure could produce a coup, even if the station was not then ordered to work directly with the armed forces. August 25, 1973 memorandum

The September 11, 1973 coup

The released record does not prove that Kissinger selected September 11, issued operational orders to Pinochet, or directed Chilean troops. Chilean officers planned and executed the final coup.

But Kissinger and Nixon had:

1. Attempted to cause a coup in 1970.

2. Maintained a covert destabilization program after Allende took office.

3. Increased pressure during the crisis preceding the 1973 overthrow.

4. Supported the new military government after Allende’s death.

The National Security Archive calls Project FUBELT a documented CIA operation “to promote a military coup and undermine Allende’s government.” Its collection includes minutes involving Kissinger, CIA cables, and operational reports. Chile declassified-document collection

An extensive modern Associated Press examination described Kissinger as a principal architect of the destabilization policy and an important supporter of Pinochet’s dictatorship. Associated Press investigation

Conclusion: Chile is the strongest case in which Kissinger was directly involved in an American policy designed to encourage an overthrow, although the evidence does not show that Washington operationally commanded the final 1973 coup.

2. Bolivia — covert support immediately before Banzer’s coup

Gen. Juan José Torres governed Bolivia from October 1970 until August 1971. His government included nationalist and leftist elements and had difficult relations with Washington.

Declassified State Department records show that the CIA provided money directly to opponents of Torres. An internal official questioned the wisdom of passing CIA money directly to opposition figures because disclosure would make the United States appear to be intervening in Bolivia.

On August 21, 1971, Gen. Hugo Banzer overthrew Torres. The State Department’s historical record says that because Banzer had taken power, the remaining authorized funds for Torres’s opponents were no longer required. Official FRUS record

Kissinger’s role was less personal and less fully documented than in Chile. As national security adviser, however, he operated at the top of the system that reviewed sensitive covert actions.

What cannot safely be claimed is that CIA money alone caused Banzer’s victory. Bolivian military officers and civilian conservatives had their own organization, objectives, and foreign connections.

Conclusion: The United States secretly assisted forces opposing a government shortly before its overthrow. Kissinger held senior oversight authority, but surviving records do not demonstrate that he personally planned Banzer’s coup.

3. Angola — covert war to determine which government took power

When Portugal withdrew from Angola in 1975, three principal movements competed for control:

• MPLA—Popular
  Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
• FNLA—National
  Front for the Liberation of Angola.
• UNITA—National
  Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

Kissinger regarded an MPLA victory, supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba, as a strategic defeat. He strongly promoted a covert program—known as IAFEATURE—supporting the FNLA and UNITA. The operation included money, weapons, assistance through Zaire, and cooperation with regional allies. South African forces also entered Angola.

The Ford administration attempted to keep the operation secret from Congress and the public. Congress eventually passed the Clark Amendment, cutting off covert assistance.

Official records repeatedly identify American covert assistance to FNLA and UNITA and efforts to establish a non-MPLA government. State Department Angola records

The operation failed to prevent the MPLA from controlling Luanda and becoming the internationally recognized government.

Conclusion: Kissinger tried to determine Angola’s postcolonial government through covert paramilitary intervention. Because Angola was only becoming independent and competing movements were fighting for power, this is better described as intervention in a civil war and attempted regime formation—not the overthrow of a settled government.

4. Iraq — using the Kurds to keep Baghdad “off balance”

In 1972, Iraq signed a major friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Kissinger subsequently supported a covert program, conducted with Iran and Israel, to aid the Kurdish rebellion led by Mustafa Barzani.

The State Department’s official history states that the objective was to keep the Iraqi Ba’athist government “off-balance.” Official Iran-Iraq history

The aid was not primarily designed to secure Kurdish independence. It was intended to pressure Iraq and serve the Shah of Iran’s strategic bargaining position. When Iran and Iraq signed the Algiers Agreement in March 1975, Iranian and American assistance was abruptly terminated. Iraqi forces then crushed the Kurdish position, producing a refugee disaster.

A congressional investigation later criticized the United States for encouraging an insurgency without intending to support its ultimate political objective.

Conclusion: Kissinger approved a dangerous destabilization program, but the available record does not establish that its principal objective was to overthrow the Iraqi government.

5. Portugal — covert political action and discussions of coup preparation

Portugal’s April 25, 1974 Carnation Revolution overthrew the long-standing authoritarian system. The Armed Forces Movement and competing civilian parties then struggled over the country’s future.

Kissinger feared that the Portuguese Communist Party would gain control and considered Portugal a potentially severe NATO crisis. Declassified records show:

• CIA
  proposals to collect intelligence and penetrate political and military
  organizations.
• Plans to
  influence the 1975 constituent-assembly election.
• Proposed
  assistance to noncommunist parties and institutions.
• Kissinger’s
  frustration that the United States had insufficient covert capability.
• His
  statement that American assets should be prepared in advance because a
  coup could not be organized in two weeks.

The Ford administration approved a covert political-action program, although Ambassador Frank Carlucci opposed Kissinger’s most pessimistic assumptions and favored supporting democratic moderates.

The official documentary collection records both the covert-action plans and Kissinger’s statements about preparing for a coup. State Department Portugal collection

There is no conclusive released evidence that Kissinger organized Portugal’s unsuccessful right-wing coup of March 11, 1975. Indeed, later documentation shows officials warning Portuguese exile groups that the United States would not support certain armed separatist plans. April 3, 1975 memorandum

Conclusion: Kissinger actively sought covert influence over Portugal’s political transition and contemplated coup contingencies, but a completed American-directed overthrow has not been established.

6. Cambodia — supported the result, but evidence of organizing the coup is lacking

On March 18, 1970, Cambodia’s National Assembly removed Prince Norodom Sihanouk while he was abroad. Prime Minister Lon Nol and Prince Sirik Matak emerged as the new rulers.

The Nixon administration welcomed the anti-communist government and later expanded American and South Vietnamese military operations into Cambodia. Kissinger became deeply involved in Cambodian bombing and war policy.

However, contemporaneous records show Kissinger asking intelligence officials after the event how the coup had happened. One account identified Lon Nol and Sirik Matak as the principal actors. March 1970 official record

That conversation weighs against the assertion that Kissinger personally planned the removal. Some historians suspect American encouragement or contacts with the plotters, but the declassified record has not produced a Chile-style operational paper trail.

Conclusion: Kissinger supported and exploited Sihanouk’s removal, but direct responsibility for organizing the coup remains unproven.

7. Cyprus — failure to prevent the coup and invasion

On July 15, 1974, the Greek military junta sponsored a coup against Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios. The coup installed Nikos Sampson, an advocate of union with Greece. Turkey invaded Cyprus five days later.

Kissinger treated the crisis primarily as a strategic dispute between two NATO allies, Greece and Turkey. Critics—including State Department Cyprus specialist Thomas Boyatt—argued that Washington:

• Had
  sufficient warnings that the Greek junta might move against Makarios.
• Failed to
  issue an effective warning or deterrent.
• Underestimated
  the probability of a coup.
• Responded
  too passively after the coup.
• Failed to
  prevent or limit the subsequent Turkish military intervention.

An internal dissent charged that American intelligence and policy handling had been seriously deficient. National Security Archive Cyprus documents

An official “Cyprus Coup Post Mortem” was later prepared for Kissinger. State Department record

The documents justify severe criticism of Kissinger’s decisions and priorities. They do not conclusively establish that he ordered the Greek junta to overthrow Makarios.

Conclusion: Strong evidence exists of warning, passivity, and strategic acquiescence—not of Kissinger directing the coup.

8. Bangladesh — an allegation not supported by released operational evidence

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated with much of his family during the August 15, 1975 military coup.

Kissinger had previously expressed skepticism about Mujib’s ability to govern. American officials discussed the possibility of military intervention in Bangladeshi politics. But prediction, private criticism, and intelligence reporting are not proof of sponsorship.

Minutes from August 15 show Kissinger receiving news and asking whether Mujib was alive. Officials described the coup as remarkably well planned, but the conversation does not indicate American authorship. Official meeting record

Conclusion: No presently available declassified evidence establishes that Kissinger authorized or assisted Mujib’s overthrow.

9. Argentina — encouragement after the coup, not proven organization of it

Argentina’s military removed President Isabel Perón on March 24, 1976. The coup had been expected for months.

Released American records do not show Kissinger planning it. They do show that he treated the junta as an anti-communist partner and privately told Argentine Foreign Minister César Guzzetti that the military should restore order quickly. Argentine officers interpreted Kissinger’s remarks as permission to conduct the “Dirty War” before congressional or public opposition in the United States became stronger.

Security forces abducted, tortured, murdered, and “disappeared” thousands of people. Kissinger repeatedly resisted making human rights the controlling feature of American policy, despite warnings from Ambassador Robert Hill and other officials.

The Associated Press concludes that Kissinger endorsed or enabled repression in both Chile and Argentina. Associated Press review

Conclusion: Kissinger’s complicity is strongest regarding the junta’s subsequent repression, not the coup’s planning.

10. East Timor — approval of an invasion that displaced a government

On December 6, 1975, President Gerald Ford and Kissinger met Indonesian President Suharto in Jakarta. Suharto explained that Indonesia might take military action against East Timor. Indonesia invaded the next day.

Declassified minutes show Ford and Kissinger expressing understanding and focusing on how Indonesia could minimize political damage. Kissinger was particularly concerned that American weapons, legally provided for defensive purposes, would be used in an offensive invasion.

Indonesia occupied East Timor and displaced the Fretilin-led government. The occupation was accompanied by mass death from warfare, killing, displacement, famine, and disease.

This was not a CIA-organized military coup. It was American political and material approval for a foreign invasion that destroyed an emerging government.

Conclusion: Kissinger did not secretly engineer an internal overthrow, but his approval helped enable an invasion with catastrophic consequences.

Final assessment

The countries should not all be placed in the same category:

Direct and substantial overthrow involvement

• Chile,
  1970–1973:
  The clearest case. Kissinger supervised and defended policies explicitly
  intended to encourage an overthrow.
• Bolivia,
  1971:
  Covert American assistance to opponents occurred immediately before the
  coup, though Kissinger’s personal operational involvement and the aid’s
  effect remain less clear.

Covert attempts to determine, weaken, or reshape governments

• Angola,
  1975–1976
• Iraq,
  1972–1975
• Portugal,
  1974–1975

Post-coup support, acquiescence, or failure to prevent an overthrow

• Cambodia,
  1970
• Cyprus,
  1974
• Argentina,
  1976

Frequently alleged but not demonstrated by released evidence

• Bangladesh,
  1975

Government removed through an invasion Kissinger helped enable

• East Timor,
  1975

The documentary record therefore supports a carefully phrased conclusion: Kissinger was directly involved in an explicit coup-promotion policy in Chile; associated with covert opposition support in Bolivia; responsible for major destabilization operations elsewhere; and willing to accept, assist, or protect several authoritarian governments that came to power through coups or invasion. It does not prove that he personally organized every overthrow commonly attributed to him.